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able with notice of the nature and extent of the agent's powers.2
Obviously a principal is not liable for his agent's deceitful representations when the circumstances are such that the person dealing with
the agent is not entitled to rely on the misrepresentations. 3 The
third person may obtain actual notice of the agent's limitations from
the contract that he signs, 4 as in the instant case, or he may obtain
constructive notice from facts that would put him on inquiry. 5 In
either event, he cannot gain rights against the principal by an act of
the agent which exceeds the known limitations 6 and the court so
held. Since the reason for holding a principal whose agent has acted
beyond his actual authority is to encourage business transactions
through agents by protecting third persons, it is only just to protect
the principal when the third person has notice that the agent is acting beyond his limitations. 7 The Court of Appeals recognized the
validity of the plaintiff's contention that one cannot protect himself
from liability for fraud by inserting a blanket clause in his contract,
but left open the question, whether or not parol evidence of a corporation's agent's statements may be introduced in an action for
fraud against the corporation where such statements are at variance
with specific provisions in a printed contract. Other jurisdictions
have held that parol evidence may be introduced to show the agent's
fraudulent misrepresentations notwithstanding the fact that it directly
contradicts the written contract,8 but an exception is made where the
party seeking to claim reliance on the agent's fraud has notice of the
limitations of the agent's authority to make the representations.9
M. R. W.

SALES-BREACH OF WARRANTY THAT ARTICLE Is NEW AND
UNUSED--REscIssIoN-DAMAGE.-Defendant, a manufacturer and

dealer in pianos, sold a piano to the plaintiff, who believed it to be new
and unused. Two years later, the plaintiff discovered that prior to its
' Miller v. Bartnet, 158 App. Div. 862, 144 N. Y. Supp. 40 (2d Dept. 1913) ;
Beck v. Donahue, 27 Misc. 230, 57 N. Y. Supp. 741 (1899) ; Deyo v. Hudson,
225 N. Y. 602, 122 N. E. 635 (1919); Dudley v. Perkins, 235 N. Y. 448, 139
N. E. 570 (1923).
'Deyo v. Hudson, 225 N. Y. 602, 612, 122 N. E. 635 (1919); Wen Kroy
Realty Co. Inc. v. Public Nat. Bank, 260 N. Y. 84, 183 N. E. 73 (1932).
'Waldorf v. Simpson, 15 App. Div. 297, 44 N. Y. Supp. 921 (3d Dept.
1897).
'Jacoby & Co. v. Payson, 85 Hun 367, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1895);
Hernandez v. Brookdale Mills, 194 App. Div. 369, 185 N. Y. Supp. 485 (1st
Dept. 1920) ; Daly v. Behrens, 118 Misc. 465, 194 N. Y. Supp. 581 (1922).
'Martin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 278 (1881).'

TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) § 19.

' Stroman v. Atlas Ref. Corp., 112 Neb. 187, 19 N. W. 26 (1924); Gridley
v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748, 262 Pac. 322 (1928).
9
Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748, 262 Pac. 322 (1928).
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sale the piano had been five years old, used, and partially rebuilt.
From a judgment granting rescission to plaintiff, defendant appeals,
contending that there was no warranty that the piano was new and
unused, and that even if such warranty had been given, plaintiff's notice of her election to rescind was not given within a reasonable time.
Held, judgment reversed and new trial granted. Plaintiff's proper action is a suit for damages for breach of warranty, since rescission
would indemnify her far in excess of the damages she suffered.
Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N. Y. 267, 200 N. E. 815 (1936).
Certain warranties of quality are implied under the statute in
every sale or contract of sale, without the necessary averment and
proof that the seller actually made said promise or representation.'
But the statute does not specifically include any implied warranty of
newness. The case at bar, therefore, presents the novel question
whether in the absence of such statutory provision, the common law
will imply the necessary warranty upon which a recovery may be
predicated. The general rule at common law is that a seller's silence
will not constitute a fraud.2 But where the seller has actual or constructive notice that the buyer is acting under a misapprehension as
to a material fact, the law will deem his fraudulent concealment
equivalent to an affirmative misrepresentation.3 In such circumstances
it is not incumbent upon the buyer to inquire whether the article is
new or used.4 The seller's failure to disclose its true identity is,
therefore, tantamount to an express warranty, and amounts to actionable fraud. 5

'N. Y.

§§ 14, 15.

PERSONAL PROP. LAW

§§ 95, 96,

97; THE UNIFORM SALES ACT

'ANsON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 221.
But non-disclosure may
vitiate a contract liberrinae fidei; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 1426.
'N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW §§ 93, 96; Nichthauser v. Friedman, 161
N. Y. S. 199 (1916) ; WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 122.

'Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397, 27 N. W. 579 (1886); Fox v. Boldt, 172
Wis. 333, 179 N. W. 1 (1920) (holding that where the seller is a manufacturer of the goods he sells, which fact is known to the buyer, a warranty that

the goods are new is implied, unless the terms of the agreement indicate a

contrary intention, or unless the buyer had an opportunity to inspect the goods
and his inspection would have disclosed the defect) ; see 2 WILLISTON, SALES
(2d ed. 1924) § 631a. Neither would it avail defendant to plead that he had
no cognizance of the defect at the time of the sale for scienter is not an essential element in an action for breach of warranty. Even long before the action
of assumpsit was allowed 'for the enforcement of a warranty, the gist of the
action although one of tort, was the affirmation of the defendant, without the
necessary averment and proof that he knew it to be false; Ames', History of
Asswmpsit (1878-79) 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8; see Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18
(1778) (the first reported decision to allow the action of assumpsit for the
enforcement of a warranty.).
'N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW § 93; THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12; Heath
v. Hurd, 124 App. Div. 68, 108 N. Y. Supp. 410 (3d Dept. 1908). Neither
is it necessary that defendant have intended to warrant, as long as the
natural tendency of his conduct is to induce the buyer to purchase the zoods
in reliance thereon; see Medina v. Stoughton, 1 Ld. Raym. 593 (Y. B. 1700),
in which Lord Holt rejected defendant's plea that he thought that the lottery
tickets which he sold to plaintiff were his own. The court held that defen-
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The issue resolves itself, however, into the question of whether
the plaintiff was awarded the proper relief for the wrong she suffered. Whenever a warranty is breached, the buyer may avail himself of two alternative remedies. He may either maintain an action
for damages for breach of warranty, or sue for rescission. 6 Here,
plaintiff is entitled to indemnification for the fraud perpetrated upon
her by defendant, even though two years had elapsed before she gave
notice of the breach. 7 But while laches does not absolve defendant
from liability for damages, it is, however, fatal to plaintiff's action for
rescission, which was deferred beyond all bounds of reasonable time.
Plaintiff is, therefore, relegated to the remedy of recovery of damages
for the breach of warranty, which will indemnify him sufficiently for
his loss.8
This decision seems to be at variance with decisions in other
jurisdictions, in its strict interpretation of Personal Property Law,
Section 150, (3). It has been held that if the delay is a consequence
of the non-discovery of the fraud, rescission
will not be denied, even
10
though considerable time has elapsed.9 In Armstrong v. Jackson,
rescission was granted after a lapse of six years, the court citing
cases 11 wherein rescission was allowed after a lapse of six, eleven,
dant's intent, or scienter, does not vindicate him in an action for breach of
warranty; Cross v. Gardner, 1 Show. 68 (1689).

'N.

Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW § 150, 1 (b), (d), 3; THE UNIFORM SALES

AcT § 69; Taylor v. Saxe, 134 N. Y. 67, 31 N. E. 258 (1892) ; see Starr v.
Torrey, 22 N. J. L. 190, which holds that plaintiff, in rescinding, is under no
duty to return the goods, an offer to return them being sufficient. Before the
adoption of The Uniform Sales Act, New York together with other jurisdictions followed the English law, which denied the right of rescission of an
executed sale, for breach of a warranty. The rule of caveat emptor prevailed.
In order to attach liability upon the seller for defective quality, an express representation or warranty, was required; Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416 (1873);

Hull v. Caldwell, 38 Dak. 451, 54 N. W. 100 (1893).
Such was also the
rule in the Roman law; HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 489. But since the adoption
of the Sales Act, the prevailing practice is to grant riscission also in executed
contracts.
' N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW § 130; THE UNIFORM SALES AcT § 69. For
the requirement of the statute that notice should be given within a reasonable
time after the buyer knows, or ought to know, of the breach, does not, however,
preclude the plaintiff from recovery where the postponement of notice was due
to the default of the defendant. For the plaintiff is not charged with the duty
of submitting to an expert to discover a latent defect in an article purported to
be flawless. But the requirement of notice within a reasonable time, which
Pers. Prop. Law, Section 150, annexes as a condition for rescission, is not
qualified by the exultanatory clause "after the buyer knows, or ought to know,
of the breach." Therein we have no indication as to the period when the
reasonable time is to start. This, the legislature, left to be determined by all
the circumstances of the particular case.
'Cf. Ketterer v. Bay View Nash Co., 192 Wis. 343, 210 N. W. 670 (1927).
'Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Lowenberg, 17 Wash. 29, 48 Pac. 785 (1897).
"(1917) 2 K. B. 822, 830.
Parker v. Ellis (1914) 2 K. B. 139. Furthermore, it is an established
rule that the buyer seeking rescission may be excused from placing the seller
in statu, quo, where destruction and injury of the goods are a consequence of
the seller's fraud, or breach of warranty; N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW § 150;
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fourteen, and fifteen years respectively. Why condemn the plaintiff
for laches, or for "slumbering upon his rights" when his legal lethargy
was superinduced by the clever concoction of the defendant? The
learned court denied rescission because awarding the plaintiff the purchase price and interest without diminution for the value of the use of
the piano for two years, would work too great a hardship on the
defendant. But rescission is an equitable remedy for the benefit of
the defrauded, and it would be more equitable to rescind the transaction, rather than to thrust the seven-year-old piano on the unwilling shoulders of the guiltless plaintiff. "A party seeking rescission
must put the other party in status quo as nearly as possible. But this
rule is wholly an equitable one; impossible things which do not tend
to accomplish equity in the particular transaction, are not required." 12
A. F.

STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS-ADEQUATE

REMEDIES-EQUITY.-

Petitioner, insurance company, issued to defendant, a corporation engaged in repairing vessels, a policy of liability insurance in July, 1924.
Defendant requested that the insurance date from June 15, 1924, and
fraudulently concealed from petitioners that an accidental injury to a
vessel had occurred on June 24, 1924. Defendant on September 24,
1932 made claim under the policy for the above mentioned loss. Actions were begun on November 7, 1932 to reform the policy so as
to exclude liability for loss resulting from the accident on the grounds
that defendant's failure to disclose facts which it was under a duty to
disclose vitiated the policy even if there were no intent to defraud.
Defendant's contention that the action was barred by the six-year
Statute of Limitations was not sustained by the court which held
that the availability of the defense of fraud was not the equivalent
of an affirmative remedy in an action at law and thus the case did
not fall in the category of concurrent jurisdiction. On appeal, held,
affirmed. Since the only adequate affirmative remedy lay in equity,
the ten and not the six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable.
Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Morse Dry Dock and Repair
Company, 270 N. Y. 86, 200 N. E. 589 (1936), aff'g, 244 App.
Div. 780, 272 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1st Dept. 1934).
THE UNIFORM SALES

AcT § 69; see Lawley v. Park, 138 Fed. 31, 70 (C. C. A.

1st, 1905) (yacht returnable, although seriously injured, due to defective construction material); Rosenthal v. Rambo, 165 Ind. 584, 76 N. E. 404 (1905)
(horse returnable even though in a worse condition than when sold, contrary
to the provision in the contract, that it may not be returned unless it is in
as sound a condition as when sold); Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E.
493 (1893).
"Sloane v. Shiffer, 156 Pa. 59, 64, 27 Atl. 67 (1893).

